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Abstract  
 
The protection of civilians at risk in armed conflict has, since the late 1990s, become 
institutionalized at the United Nations (UN), gaining acceptance as a normative rationale for UN 
peacekeeping. However, the bulk of civilians in need of protection in armed conflict are unlikely 
WRDWWDLQLW7KHDUWLFOHGHYHORSVDQDUJXPHQWRQµSDUWLFXODUL]HGSURWHFWLRQ
± particularized in that 
UN Security Council (SC) mandates are formulated and adjusted over time to direct mission 
protection to specific subsets of civilian populations, that is, those relevant to the UN itself, the 
host state, other states, NGOs and the media, leaving most local civilians receiving little effective 
protection. Particularized protection, we argue, is a result of the institutional dynamics involving 
actors producing mandates ± the UNSC ± and those providing protection ± peacekeeping missions 
± whereby mandates are specified to direct mission protection to selected, particularized groups. 
We demonstrate these dynamics in two cases, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia. 
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µOver time, civilian protection has«become critical not 
only to the legitimacy« [of] peacekeeping operations but 
also to the credibility of the entire UN system¶  
Brahimi Report (2000)1 
µ&LYLOLDQVFRQWLQXHWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RI
casualties in current conflicts. They are regularly targeted 
and subjHFWWRLQGLVFULPLQDWHDWWDFNVDQGRWKHUYLRODWLRQV¶ 
UN Secretary-General Report (2013)2 
µ[I]n only a minority of incidents«LQYROYLQJGLUHFWDWWDFNV
on civilians, including very serious incidents, was any 
LPPHGLDWHUHVSRQVHUHSRUWHGE\PLVVLRQV¶. 
UN Office of Internal Oversight Report (2014)3 
Introduction 
 Since the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations (UN) has increasingly been 
preoccupied with civilian protection. How effectively it responds, or is perceived to 
having responded, to protect civilians at risk has become a central criterion of legitimacy 
for the UN today.4  
 The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (POC) as a separate, thematic issue 
has become a normative foundation for UN protection action. It has been institutionalized 
at the UN since the late 1990s.5 µProtection of civilians is a strategic objective of 
peacekeeping, with peacekeeping itself a flagship activity of the [UN@¶6 By 2014, 13 UN 
peacekeeping missions had operated under POC mandates, engaging µDERXWSHUFHQW
of uniformeGSHUVRQQHO¶ currently deployed.7 
In practice, however, most civilians requiring protection do not receive it. There is 
a sharp disjuncture between the rhetorical protection extended by the UNSC through its 
mandates and the extent of protection realized by civilians on the ground.8 As a recent 
UN LQWHUQDOUHSRUWVXJJHVWVµFULWLFDOPLVVWHSVLQSURWHFWLQJFLYLOLDQVKDYHRFFXUUHGLQWKH
SDVWDQGWKHFRQWLQXLQJULVNWRWKHUHSXWDWLRQRIWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQUHPDLQVKLJK¶.9 
In general terms, this is not unexpected or surprising. It is the hard reality of 
µimpossible mandates¶.10 Resources, human and financial, are always inadequate to meet 
the multi-layered spectrum of protections civilian populations require. Responses are 
inevitably delayed, inefficient, and idiosyncratic.11 However, resource constraints, we 
argue, are not solely responsible for ineffective protection. 
Closer examination of UN peacekeeping missions12 reveals complex institutional 
dynamics leading to an outcome, characteristic of most all missions, we label as 
µparticularized protection¶. Protection efforts are particularized in that over time mandates 
and mission operations are adjusted to direct protection to specific subsets of civilian 
populations,13 that is, those relevant to the UN itself (UN personnel), to the host state 
(state officials), to other states (foreign nationals), to NGOs (humanitarian workers), and 
to the media (journalists). The paradoxical result is that local civilian populations (e.g., 
women and children, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)), whose plight 
draws initial UN attention and motivates a POC response, in the end actually receive little 
effective protection.  
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The dynamics responsible involve the interaction over time between actors 
mandating protection²the Security Council (SC) (with input from the Secretary General 
(SG), Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and key regional actors)²and those 
responsible for providing protection²peacekeeping missions UHSUHVHQWHGE\WKH6*¶V
Special Representative (SRSG)). Thus, a process is set in motion in which mandates are 
initially specified, but then subsequently reissued and revised in response to SG 
recommendations, changing circumstances and mission priorities on the ground. Actual 
protection by the mission is provided to increasingly selectively defined, particularized 
groups.  
We advance this argument through the following stages. Section II outlines the 
institutionalization of POC at the UN. Section III develops a typology of particularized 
protection at mandate and mission levels and articulates our argument on the institutional 
dynamics of particularized protection. The argument is demonstrated through the analysis 
of two cases²Côte G¶,YRLUHDQG6RPDOLD²in Section IV, followed by a brief conclusion.  
7KH81¶V,nstitutionalization of POC 
 The normative foundations of the imperative to protect civilians in war have deep 
historical roots, reinforced with the development of international humanitarian law (IHL), 
refugee law and human rights law and the establishment of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. The UN Charter and its agencies (e.g., the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children¶V)XQG all invoke general principles of the 
responsibility to alleviate human suffering in times of war. 
 It is following the crises and dramatic failures of the 1990s that POC emerged as a 
separate, thematic issue for the UN. Faced with a crisis of legitimacy, the UN began to 
address civilian protection, initially through two SG reports in 1998.14 The next year the 
UNSC mandated POC for the first time in Resolution 1270 on Sierra Leone, authorizing 
UN peacekeepers to µafford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence¶²this language effectively serving since as the definition of POC.15 
 These initial steps triggered over the next decade and a half a cascading series of 
SG reports,16 UNSC resolutions and presidential statements,17 and General Assembly 
debates on POC.18 Various agencies, including the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), have 
been involved.19 In effect, the norm of protection of civilians has been institutionalized at 
the UN.20 Bellamy and Williams have labeled this trend as µthe new politics of 
protection¶21  
However, the consensus on the priority of civilian protection has not meant the 
agreement on its definition.22 POC has been entangled LQWKH81¶VRQJRLQJGHEDWHVon 
µhuman security¶ µhumanitarian intervention¶ and µResponsibility to Protect¶ (R2P).23 It 
has been specifically distinguished from R2P to avoid controversies surrounding the 
latter²debates not taken up here.24  
Of the numerous dimensions of civilian protection, we focus on two²protection 
offered by the UNSC and peacekeeping missions.25 The first reflects UNSC decisions to 
extend protection to civilians caught up in conflict through mandates; the second 
concerns the provision of protection by UN and UN-authorized peacekeeping missions on 
the ground.  
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Particularized Protection  
Despite institutionalization of POC at the UN, the result for civilians has been an 
historical failure to achieve inclusive and effective civilian protection. Thus, the Brahimi 
Report in 2000 highlighted that µ[t]here are hundreds of thousands of civilians in current 
United Nations mission areas,¶ and that µforces currently deployed could not protect more 
than a small fraction of them, even if directed to do so¶26 A decade and a half later a UN 
evaluation of SHDFHNHHSLQJRSHUDWLRQVRIIHUHGµlittle room for optimism¶27 µ>&@ivilians 
continue to suffer violence and displacement in many countries where United Nations 
missions hold protection of civilians mandates,¶ it concluded.28 
 While insufficient resources facing missions have been widely regarded as a 
central impediment to effective civilian protection,29 we argue that it is only part of the 
problem. In the following sections we point out that select groups of civilians receive 
greater attention in mandates and mission operations and develop an institutional 
argument on who gets protected and how.  
A Typology of Particularized Protection  
Our review of UNSC mandates for peacekeeping missions30 highlights salient 
differences in terms of the delineation of civilian population subsets and associated 
responsibilities for their protection. This is summarized in the following typology of 
particularized protection, which indicates which groups are likely to get protected over 
the course of the mission. 
UNSC protection: Mandates 
 The Security Council establishes the parameters for addressing POC through its 
formulation and subsequent revisions of mandates for UN and UN-authorized missions. 
Mandates fall along two dimensions (see Table 1 below). The first concerns overall 
civilian populations. Mandates may be µactive¶ where a mission is directly charged, or 
authorized under Chapter VII to use µall necessary means to protect [all] civilians under 
LPPLQHQWWKUHDWRISK\VLFDOYLROHQFH¶;31 or µnon-active¶ where the UNSC µcalls upon¶ 
µurges¶ or µrequests¶ conflict parties to refrain from violence against civilians, giving no 
direction for specific POC actions.32 Whereas µDFWLYH¶32&PDQGDWHVare directives to 
translate into mission strategy for protection of civilian populations RQWKHJURXQGµQRQ-
DFWLYH¶PDQGDWHVGRQRW\LHOGDQH[SHFWDWLRQIRUSURWHFWLRQDW the operational level. 
The second dimension of mandates relates to specific population subsets. In many 
cases, through the invocation of UNSC thematic resolutions,33 broad categories of 
civilians are afforded µdeclaratory¶ protection. That is, the UNSC signals attentiveness to 
a group, but does not direct specific POC actions. For example, Resolution 1479, 
establishing a UN military liaison group in Côte G¶,YRLUH0,1UCI), ZLWKDµQRQ-DFWLYH¶
mandate, calls for µspecial attention¶ to human rights, especially of women and children 
µin accordance with Resolution 1325¶ but authorizes no direct action on their behalf. 
These blanket calls for protection are essentially rhetorical, and are motivated by the 
perceived necessity for the UNSC to be seen to act.  
In contrast, the UNSC may explicitly authorize a mission to protect specific 
groups of interest to stakeholders (e.g., UN personnel, state officials, foreign nationals, 
humanitarians, journalists), thus mandating what we term µdesignated¶ protection. For 
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TABLE 1 
MANDATE PROTECTION 
 
Target Type Description  
 
Civilian population  
Active  UNSC authorizes mission to protect civilians 
Non-active  UNSC does not authorize mission to protect civilians 
 
Specific group(s) 
Declaratory  UNSC calls on civilian groups to be protected 
Designated  UNSC authorizes civilian groups to be protected 
 
instance, Resolution 1528, in establishing the UN Operation in Côte G¶,YRLUH812&,
with an µactive¶ POC mandate, directs it µto support, in coordination with the Ivorian 
authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government¶34  
Both µdeclaratory¶ and µdesignated¶ protection may be specified in the initial, 
establishing mission mandates, but also occur later in the life of a mission. Similarly, 
overall mandates can change from µactive¶ to µnon-active¶ and vice versa, reflecting the 
changing circumstances and priorities on the ground and within the UN.  
Peacekeeping protection: Mission 
A fundamental disconnect has developed between expectations, based on 
mandates, and the actual delivery of civilian protection through peacekeeping operations. 
On the one hand, there is a broad normative expectation that the UN has a responsibility 
to protect civilians in violent conflict.35 This charge was accepted by the UN itself²the 
Brahimi Report declaring that if UN missions encounter civilians under attack, they have 
a moral obligation to act and are µpresumed to be authorized to stop it¶36  
On the other hand, peacekeeping missions confront daunting challenges. Designed 
to support post-conflict peace and stability, missions are ill suited to peace enforcement 
necessitating the use of force to save civilian lives in contexts without host country 
consent and possibly acting against state forces themselves. µThe use of force is legally 
authorized and consistent with the intent of the Security Council and the expectations of 
civilians,¶D81LQWHUQDOUHSRUWconfirms, µbut appears to have been routinely avoided as 
an option by peacekeeping operations¶37 
Protection of civilians that UN and UN-authorized missions deliver is, thus, 
always µpartial¶ZLWKUHJDUGWRRYHUDOOFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQV7KDWLVRnly a small fraction 
of civilian populations at risk can be provided meaningful protection, given resource 
constraints (see Table 2 below). This conclusion is widely recognized.38  
:HDUJXHKRZHYHUWKDWDORQJZLWKµSDUWLDO¶UHVXOWVIRURYHUDOOFLYLOLDQ
SRSXODWLRQVPLVVLRQSURWHFWLRQLVDOVRµselective¶7KDWLV either because µdesignated¶ 
protection is directed in the mandate, or because of political, geographic or other 
contextual considerations, missions look to protect selected population subsets. This 
specification of civilian groups to be protected over the course of the mission lies at the 
core of particularized protection. 
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TABLE 2 
MISSION PROTECTION 
 
Target Type Description 
Civilian population Partial Mission fails to protect overall civilian population 
Specific group(s) Selective Mission prioritizes and directs its protection to 
specified civilian groups  
 
 
Institutional Dynamics of Particularized Protection  
Our preliminary review of selected UN mission experiences39 indicates a 
discernible pattern in this politics of particularized protection, a logic that encompasses 
competing notions of protection and processes of interaction between the headquarters 
(HQ) (the UNSC with input from the SG, TCCs and key regional actors) and the field 
(peacekeeping missions represented by SRSGs).40 Figure 1 (below) depicts a simplified 
version of the institutional dynamics41 that produces the result of particularized 
protection.  
Stage 1: Initial UNSC mandate 
The stage is set by the UNSC¶VLQLWLDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH81¶VUROHLQ32&DVLW
considers responding to a specific situation (see Figure 1, Stage 1 below). Considering 
input from the SG, TCCs and key regional actors, the UNSC may define an µactive¶ or 
µnon-active¶ mandate regarding the overall civilian population of concern. It can then 
invoke µdeclaratory¶ protection for broad population subsets, such as women and children 
or IDPs, and µdesignated¶ protection for specific groups²usually, in the first instance, 
UN personnel, state officials and humanitarians. 
Critically, mandates are µpolitical statements, negotiated texts that give direction 
to peacekeeping missions, rather than operational documents that lay out the specifics of 
DPLVVLRQ¶VRSHUDWLRQV¶42 UNSC members are aware that their failure to respond when 
civilians are systematically victimized, especially in mass atrocities highlighted through 
the media, jeopardizes the legitimacy of the UNSC and the UN as a whole.43 As stated by 
a UNSC country representative, µ>P@ore than any other issue, we will be judged by our 
actions and by our failures to act on protection challenges¶44 In response, the UNSC has 
µevince[d] a marked progression towards giving POC an increasingly central role, and in 
authorizing coercive force under Chapter VII¶45  
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals what Bellamy and Williams define as µWKHnew 
politics of protection¶ are fraught with serious tensions regarding UN responses to 
conflict.46 The UNSC sensitivity to be seen to act has fostered a tendency for mandate 
overreach²what Barnett and Finnemore characterize DVµa search for symbolic 
leJLWLPDF\UDWKHUWKDQHIILFLHQF\¶47 That is, the UNSC creates mandates replete with 
pronouncements on POC and expansive µdeclaratory¶ protections not supported by either 
political will or resources for implementation.48 Paradoxically, Ban Ki-Moon has 
characterized this trend to µprogressively broader mandates¶ as a positive development.49 
7KHµH[SHFWHG¶UHVXOWKRZHYHUDVWKH%UDKLPL5HSRUWVWDWHVLVIDLOXUHVRIWKH81
µRFFXUUHGEHFDXVHWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLODQGWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVFUDIWHGDQGVXSSRUWHG 
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FIGURE 1 
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF PARTICULARIZED PROTECTION 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as 
WKH\IDLOHG¶50 Albeit that mandates RIWHQFRQWDLQµgeographical, temporal and capability-
based caveats¶to limit mission responsibilities and dampen expectations, 51 this has done 
little to alleviate the µcommitment gap¶ confronted in the field.52 µA general lament is the 
unrealistic expectations of mandates¶WKHODWHVWHigh-Level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations confirms.53 
The problem is further complicated by the UN¶VLQDELOLW\WRFDUU\RXWPLVVLRQVRQ
its own, having to rely on µYROXQWDU\FRQWULEXWLRQRISHUVRQQHOE\0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ willing 
and able to mobilize troops to operate in geographical regions and over large territories 
encompassed in UN missions.54 As µno developed country currently contributes troops to 
the most difficult >PLVVLRQV@¶the burden and risk has devolved to the developing world.55 
7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\SUREOHPDWLFJLYHQWKDWµDGHTXDWHPHFKDQLVPVIRU>7&&V@WRSDUWLFLSDWH
in the formulation of peacekHHSLQJPDQGDWHV¶KDYHQRWEHHQGHYHORSHG56 Moreover, 
having provided an authorization, the UN cannot ensure mandates are implemented as 
directed, because µVWDWHVRIWHQUHWDLQFRQWURORIWKHLUQDWLRQDOFRQWLQJHQWV¶.57  
Mandate 
 
Mission 
STAGE 2 
STAGE 1 
STAGE 3 
Initial UNSC 
Mandate: 
 
Active/non-active 
re: population 
 
Declaratory, 
designated  
re: groups 
UN Mission: 
 
Partial  
re: population  
 
Selective  
re: groups  
 
Situational 
Changes and  
UN Mission 
Adjustments: 
 
Prioritization of 
groups to be 
protected 
 
HQ-Field 
Interaction: 
 
SG Reporting 
(SRSG input) 
UNSC Mandate 
Adjustment: 
 
Mandates change  
(e.g., from non-
active to active, 
particularized 
further) 
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These tensions are intensified by the deepening of fundamental divisions among 
UN member states over the nature and purpose of UN involvement in conflict situations. 
States concerned with encroachment on state sovereignty insist on host state consent 
before UNSC authorization.58 In some situations, halting atrocities against civilians may 
require action against state forces, especially for mass atrocity crimes, in the absence of 
state authority and emergence of µspoilers¶ whose interests are served by perpetuation of 
conflict and deliberate targeting of civilians and actors seeking to ease civilian distress. 
These factors complicate production of mandates and initial mission operations. 
Stage 2: Mission protection 
With entrance into the field (see Figure 1, Stage 2 above), the UHVXOWLVµpartial¶ 
protection for civilians, preordained by the type of the UNSC mandate. Where the UNSC 
provides a µnon-active¶ mandate, i.e., calls on the parties to not harm civilians without 
specifying mission actions, DQGµdeclaratory¶JURXSVDUHQRWHGprotection will seldom, if 
ever, be realized through mission planning, resourcing and operations. Where the UNSC 
provides aQµDFWLYH¶32&PDQGDWHDXWKRUL]LQJSURWHFWLRQIRUWKHFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQWKH
effect is a mission that lacks, in relative and absolute terms, adequate human and materiel 
resources to deliver.59 ,QRWKHUZRUGVµno mission can be expected to protect all civilians 
all the time¶60 As a result, limited protection, if at all, is provided to those civilians most 
in need, even where they are noted in mandates. 
Instead, mission efforts are generally devoted to population subsets µdesignated¶ 
in UNSC mandates, or those selected by mission commanders based on the circumstances 
they face.61 Despite the conditions of complex scarcity and political exigencies, mission 
commanders must make immediate decisions upon entering the field as to which civilians 
to protect and which not. Protection, as a result, is µselective¶3riority goes to groups 
seen as integral to the mission²UN personnel, state officials involved in negotiations 
and humanitarian workers. Other groups of interest to external actors receive remedy as 
well. Evacuation of foreign nationals is an example.62 
As the situation on the ground unfolds, the mission¶s POC priorities are adjusted. 
Indeed, threats to local civilians may increase with the PLVVLRQ¶Varrival.63 However, the 
necessity of defending UN personnel may leave few, if any, resources for POC. As a UN 
LQWHUQDOUHSRUWILQGVµ>I@RUFHZDVPRVWOLNHO\WREHXVHG«ZKHQWURRSVZHUHHQJDJHGLQ
self-defencHRUGHIHQFHRI8QLWHG1DWLRQVSHUVRQQHODQGSURSHUW\¶64 Faced with such 
competing priorities, mission commanders, thus, µmay not view civilian protection as an 
LPPHGLDWHRUFHQWUDOFRQFHUQ«RUDVDQDFWLYHSDUWRIWKHPDQGDWH¶65  
Furthermore, mission commanders face challenges in deciding how to interpret 
the notion of µimminent threat of physical violence¶. 7KHUHLVµQRXQDQLPLW\DPRQJWURRS-
FRQWULEXWLQJFRXQWULHVRQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV³LPPLQHQWWKUHDW´¶66 Absent 
direct attacks on civilians, determining those under threat is difficult and acting in a 
preventive manner for all possibilities is beyond mission capacities. Once local civilians 
are under attack, the need for response is obvious and presumably is to be delivered. Yet, 
response is subject to geographical and other mandated caveats and rules of engagement, 
ZKLFKµset the parameters for legitimate protection activities¶, including the use of 
force.67 These limitations often leave predation on civilians unchecked. 
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Stage 3: UNSC mandate adjustment  
A pattern of communication and feedback (see Figure 1, Stage 3 above) follows 
between the mission and SRSGs on the one hand, and the UNSC and the SG on the other. 
This relationship, realized through SG reporting to the UNSC, keeps the HQ and the field 
informed of relevant local developments, especially violent incidents, changes to security 
conditions and negotiations. It is central to UNSC mandate adjustments (e.g., from µnon-
active¶ to µactive¶SDUWLFXODUL]DWLRQRIIXUWKHU groups) in the miVVLRQ¶VFRXUVH.  
The Secretary General greatly impacts the shaping of mandates by recommending 
changes to overall mandates and specific groups for protection.68 As the latest High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations FRQILUPVµ>Z@KLOHWKH6HFXULW\&ouncil is 
ultimately responsible for issuing these decisions, the mandates are usually adopted 
following specific recommendations provided by the Secretary-*HQHUDO¶69 Hence, the 
UNSC adjusts mandates upon considering recommendations drawn from SG reports. For 
instance, at the overall mandate level, following SG recommendations, the UNSC 
established MINUCI in Côte G¶,YRLUH in Resolution 1479, and refrained from authorizing 
DQµDFWLYH¶PDQGDWHLQ6RPDOLD. In terms of specific groups for protection, the inclusion 
LQPDQGDWHVFRQFHUQLQJ&{WHG¶,YRLUHRISURWHFWLRQRIsubsets of civilians from 
peacekeepers accused of sexual abuse, and the addition of protection activities related to 
arms embargos and piracy concerning Somalia, are exemplary. 
In turn, SG recommendations are affected by SRSGs, who play a critical role in 
the HQ-field relationship.70 Having broad µsystem-wide responsibilities¶ for the 
functioning of all aspects of a mission, i.e., encompassing all UN and UN-authorized 
presences in a host country, SRSGs influence mission management, both from the HQ 
and in the field.71 ,PSRUWDQWO\KHUHµ>S@ractices from the field, crystallized through the 
actions of SRSGs, constitute a bottom-XSVRXUFHRILQIOXHQFH¶RQ816&decisions.72 This 
role proves to be daunting when faced with mandates that are unclear and complex, UN 
bureaucracies looking to protect their vested interests, and mission commanders with 
their own senses of priorities.73 
In sum, the politics of protection is multilayered, complex, and contradictory²
only partially because of the limited resources and challenges of peacekeepers on the 
ground. The protection picture is further complicated by the institutional dynamics, 
whereby POC mandates are increasingly specified over time. Particularized protection is 
the result²limited and specific subsets of civilians receive protection; most do not. The 
sections below demonstrate this argument in two cases, Côte G¶,YRLUHDQG6RPDOLD.74 
Case Studies: Côte G¶,YRLUHDQG6RPDOLD 
µOur ability to protect people is limited. The French are 
here to look after mainly the French¶ 
  Human Rights Watch (2005)75 
µThe main driver behind the call for UN peacekeeping was 
not [POC]«EXWUDWKHU³SURWHFWLRQ´RIWKH7)* 
[Transitional Federal Government], in the sense that 
security was considered necessary to allow the new 
government to make progress in the peace process¶ 
Security Council Report (2010)76 
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The quotes above capture the result of particularized protection experienced in the 
contrasting cases of Côte G¶,YRLUHDQG6RPDOLD in the 2000s respectively. Despite their 
differences, the two missions follow similar institutional dynamics leading to this result. 
While the former is a UN mission, with forces under UN command, the latter is a UN-
authorized mission, with the African Union (AU) providing manpower and conducting 
the operations. Whereas Côte G¶,YRLUHproceeded from an µactive¶ POC mandate, the 
mission in Somalia was DµQRQ-DFWLYH¶PDQGDWH at its outset.  
As both missions evolved, µdeclaratory¶ and µdesignated¶ groups were added 
through a pattern of communication and feedback between the HQ and the field. The 
mandates were increasingly particularized. Attention on the ground was afforded to 
priority groups, leaving the bulk of civilians at risk with little effective protection. In 
what follows we outline the institutional cycles of particularized protection (as 
represented in Figure 1 above) in the two cases. 
&{WHG¶,YRLUH 
 Divided along ethnic, cultural, and religious lines, Côte G¶,YRLUH saw an escalation 
of armed conflict over government in the early 2000s, with attempts at a peace agreement 
interrupted by the recurrence of violence.77 Initial UN engagement in the situation was an 
effort to support a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the official government and 
the rebel forces and halt systematic violence against civilians that was most widespread in 
WKHFRXQWU\¶V:HVW.78 Over time, UN engagement then VKLIWHGEHWZHHQµDFWLYH¶DQGµQRQ-
DFWLYH¶PDQGDWHVGHSHQGLQJRQWKHSURJUHVVLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVVee Table 3 below). 
Despite continued violence against civilians, priority was given to government officials 
and UN personnel, especially as they came under attack LQWKHPLVVLRQ¶VFRXUVH 
Cycle 1: FURPµaFWLYH¶WRµnon-aFWLYH¶DQGback  
The stage in Côte G¶,YRLUH was set with Resolution 1464 (2003), which gave the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and France an µactive¶ POC 
mandate under Chapter VII, µGHVLJQDWLQJ¶UN personnel as a priority group to be 
protected. As the peace process evolved, Resolution 1479 (2003) established a military 
liaison group, MINUCI, ZLWKDµQRQ-DFWLYH¶PDQGDWHLQKRSHVWKDWWKHFRQIOLFWZRXOGEH
settled by peaceful means.79  
7KHUHVXOWRQWKHJURXQGZDVµSDUWLDO¶SURWHFWLRQUnfortunately, the situation 
deteriorated with the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which µcreated a Zone 
of Confidence between areas in the South controlled by the National Armed Forces of 
Côte G¶Ivoire and areas in WKH1RUWKDQG:HVWFRQWUROOHGE\WKH)RUFHV1RXYHOOHV¶.80 
Demonstrations, ceasefire violations, violence against the Forces Nouvelles Cabinet 
Ministers, civilians, particularly Liberian refugees and migrant workers, and 
humanitarian workers spread.81  
These situational changes prompted further adjustments to the mandate. The SG 
recommended the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force.82 Resolution 1528 (2004) 
SXWLQIRUFH812&,ZLWKDQµactive¶ POC mandate and French forces authorized to µuse 
all necessary means¶ to support it. UN and humanitarian personnel and local government 
RIILFLDOVZHUHµGHVLJQDWHG¶IRUSURWHFWLRQ. Women and children were afforded 
µGHFODUDWRU\¶SURWHFWLRQ. 
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TABLE 3 
3$57,&8/$5,=('3527(&7,21,1&Ð7('¶,92,5( 
 
List of abbreviations:  
Foreign nationals (FN) 
Government officials (G)  
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)  
International humanitarian law (IHL) 
International personnel (IP) 
Protection by presence (PBP) 
Women and children (WC) 
 
Cycle 2: The crisis of protection 
'HVSLWHFKDQJHVWRWKHPDQGDWHDVSHDFHNHHSHUVGHSOR\HGµSDUWLDO¶SURWHFWLRQ
was the result on the ground. 812&,¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGFKRLFHRISURWHFWLRQWRROVi.e., 
protection by deterrent presence, established through periodic patrols and guard duties, 
left most civilians vulnerable.83 Casualties resulted from demonstrations, ceasefire 
violations and military operations. In March 2004 demonstrators clashed with the Ivorian 
security forces.84 In April peacekeepers assisted state forces in preventing further 
violence.85 However, violence, especially against foreign nationals, continued. As the SG 
FRQFOXGHGµthe United Nations cannot impose, let alone enforce, peace on the Ivorian 
people, nor can it protect them from themselves¶86  
 
RESOLUTION 
1464 (2003) 1479 (2003) 1528 (2004) 1584 (2005); 
1603 (2005); 
1609 (2005) 
1765 (2007) 1933 (2010); 
1962 (2010); 
1975 (2011) 
 
 
Mandate 
Protection 
Civilian 
population 
 
 
Active 
 
Non-active 
 
Active  
 
Non-active 
 
Active 
Specific 
group(s) 
Designated 
(IP) 
N/A Designated 
(IP; G) 
Declaratory 
(WC) 
 
Designated 
(FN) 
Declaratory 
(WC; IDPs) 
Declaratory 
(IHL) 
 
Mission 
Protection 
Civilian 
population 
Partial 
(PBP) 
N/A Partial 
(PBP)  
Partial  
(PBP) 
Partial 
(PBP) 
Partial 
(force) 
 
Specific 
group(s) 
Selective 
(IP) 
N/A Selective 
(G) 
Selective  
(G; IP; FN) 
Selective 
(G) 
Selective 
(G) 
 
Situational Changes Linas-
Marcoussis 
Agreement 
Deterioration 
with Linas-
Marcoussis 
Agreement 
French base 
bombing 
Abuse by 
UNOCI 
 
Ouagadougou 
Peace 
Agreement 
Tensions 
around 
elections 
 
SG Recommendation Establish 
military 
liaison 
Establish 
UN mission 
Reassess 
operations 
priorities  
Refocus from 
protection to 
elections 
Refocus to 
civilian 
protection 
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3URWHFWLRQZDVDOVRµVHOHFWLYH¶Forces Nouvelles MinistersµGHVLJQDWHG¶LQWKH
mandate, were the focus of protection.87 Moreover, threats against peacekeepers 
increased.88 After the bombing on 6 November of a French base the mission prioritized 
foreign nationals and personnel for protection.89 Evacuation of foreign nationals, 
particularly French, followed.90 Additional troops were sent to protect UNOCI 
personnel.91  
Added to these µpartial¶ and µselective¶ results, UNOCI itself was involved in 
violence against civilians. Information on sexual exploitation and abuse by UNOCI 
emerged over the period.92 As Bellamy and Williams put it, µ[d]espite its robust mandate, 
812&,SURYHGXQDEOHWRSUHYHQW*EDJER¶VIRUFHV from attacking the Forces Nouvelles 
in late 2004 or to protect civilians from periodic abuses. Indeed, some of its personnel 
were themselves accused of sexually abusing and exploiting the locals¶93 
The crisis µEURXJKWLQWRIRFXV812&,¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVUHJDUGLQJWKHSURWHFWion 
of civilians¶ and prompted the UNSC to reiterate the importance of protecting personnel 
and µdesignate¶ protection to a new group²foreign nationals.94 Resolutions 1572 (2004) 
imposing an arms embargo and 1584 (2005) authorizing UNOCI to monitor it specified 
these additions. Furthermore, Resolution 1603 (2005), which endorsed the Pretoria peace 
Agreement, expressed grave concern with the misconduct of the troops and added 
µGHFODUDWRU\¶SURWHFWLRQIRUZRPHQ. 
Given these developments, the SG requested the UNSC to approve additional 
resources and UHDVVHVV812&,¶VRSHUDWLRQDOSULRULWLHVVRDVWRSODFHpersonnel security as 
a top priority, but also monitor the ceasefire and arms embargo.95 The UNSC extended 
the mandate accordingly in Resolution 1609 (2005). Regarding POC, it repeated the 
language of Resolution 1528 (2004) and did not invite changes on the ground.  
Hence, UNOCI continued to conduct patrols as a means to protect civilians. Yet, 
attacks against civilians and ceasefire violations persisted. Protection of the overall 
civilian population, as a result, remained µpartial¶µSelective¶ protection continued to be 
afforded to UN personnel and government officials.96 
Cycle 3: Mandate reorientation and particularized protection  
In a new institutional cycle starting with the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of 4 
March 2007, UNOCI saw a reorientation of its POC mandate. The SG advised the UNSC 
to refocus from civilian protection to elections support and agreement implementation, as 
reflected in Resolution 1765 (2007).97 To include civilian protection concerns, this and 
further resolutions made µdeclaratory¶ calls to protect vulnerable civilian populations, 
including women and children and IDPs.98 In addition, the UNSC requested UNOCI to 
continue to contribute to the promotion of human rights.99 
 On the ground, UNOCI continued to provide µselective¶ protection to government 
officials and conducted patrols throughout the country. As the SG VXPPHGXS812&,¶V
µnew concept of operations« provide[d] for a shift from the previous static 
deployment« to a configuration that enable[d] the force to be more mobile and to cover 
the entire territory of Côte G¶,YRLUH« to help the national security forces to provide a 
secure environment for the re-establishment of State authority¶100  
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However, tensions around elections began to rise, resulting in increasing civilian 
casualties. As a result, the UNSC reestablished an µactive¶ POC mandate in Resolution 
1933 (2010). µDeclaratory¶ calls to the Ivorian parties were also made. Resolution 1962 
(2010) reiterated the importance for UNOCI µto implement its [POC] mandate¶101 With 
the escalation of violence following the November 2010 presidential elections crisis, the 
UNSC authorized UNOCI in Resolution 1975 (2011) to µuse all necessary means¶ to 
protect civilians, including by µprevent[ing] the use of heavy weapons against the civilian 
population¶102 The UNSC recognized Alassane Ouattara, related to the Forces Nouvelles, 
as president, condemning his opponent Laurent *EDJER¶VUHIXVDOWRQHJRWLDWH.  
Peacekeepers, thus, JRWLQYROYHGLQWKH,YRULDQZDULQ2XDWWDUUD¶VIDYRU Their use 
of force in early 2011 was µ[t]he most obvious and dramatic way in which« [the] 
protection mandate¶ was pursued.103 They attacked military camps and destroyed heavy 
weapons and weapons stockpiles, pushing Gbagbo out. The result, as could be expected, 
was particularized protection. Protection for civilian population was µpartial¶
Peacekeepers µfailed to protect civilians²especially those loyal to Gbagbo¶104 It was 
also µselective¶ as the mission focused on the protection of Ouattarra and his loyalists. 
In sum, as the mission in Côte G¶,YRLUH PRYHGEHWZHHQµDFWLYH¶DQGµQRQ-DFWLYH¶
mandates over the three institutional cyclesµ3DUWLDO¶SURWHFWLRQPDLQO\E\XVHRISDWUROV
was afforded to the overall civilian population. As the mission evolved, with the changing 
circumstances on the ground and corresponding mandate adjustments, specific groups 
ZHUHµGHVLJQDWHG¶LQPDQGDWHVDQGµVHOHFWHG¶IRUSURWHFWLRQE\WKHPLVVLRQ 
Somalia 
A similar pattern of particularized protection characterized Somalia. Whereas the 
UN (UN Operation in Somalia I and II) and UN-authorized (US-led United Task Force) 
intervention in the 1990s was motivated by civilian protection concerns, as Somalia was 
torn by the armed conflict, state collapse and humanitarian crisis,105 the core issues in the 
2000s included piracy, terrorism and regional concerns. Multiple armed groups continued 
to operate in the country, targeting civilians and humanitarian convoys.106 In addressing 
protection, the UNSC, thus, focused on safe access for humanitarian assistance. The UN-
authorized AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) began in 2007 with a µnon-active¶ 
mandate, as noted in Table 4 (below). µDeclaratory¶ and µdesignated¶ groups were 
specified in resolutions, but no broad-based protection for civilians was authorized. 
As the situation evolved, with the SG pointing to developments that put additional 
civilian groups at risk, the UNSC added their protection to the mandate. While in 2011 
the mandate became µactive¶, the result on the ground remained µpartial¶ and µselective¶ 
protection. Peacekeepers prioritized protection for those groups designated in mandates 
and DFFRUGLQJWRWKHPLVVLRQ¶V interpretation of needs and DYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHVµ3DUWLDO¶
protection, if at all, was afforded to the overall civilian population. 
&\FOHµ1RQ-aFWLYH¶mandate 
Despite the dire conditions for civilians, a µnon-active¶ AMISOM was launched 
by Resolution 1744 (2007) to support the peace process, protect Transitional Federal 
Institutions (TFIs), especially the Government (TFG), and AU personnel and contribute 
to the creation of necessary security conditions for humanitarian access. As in Côte 
G¶,YRLUH state officials and AU personnel were the µdesignated¶ groups to be protected.   
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TABLE 4 
PARTICULARIZED PROTECTION IN SOMALIA 
 
 
RESOLUTION 
1744 (2007) 1772 (2007) 1910 (2010) 2010 (2011) 2073 (2012) 
 
Mandate 
Protection 
Civilian 
population 
 
 
Non-active 
 µ$FWLYH¶  Non-active 
Specific 
group(s) 
Designated 
(IP; G)  
Designated 
(H) 
Declaratory 
(WC) 
 
Declaratory 
(H; J; WC) 
Declaratory 
(H; WC) 
Designated 
(IP; G) 
 
Mission 
Protection 
Civilian 
population 
Partial 
(force) 
Partial  
(force) 
Partial 
(force) 
Partial 
(force) 
Partial 
(force) 
 
Specific 
group(s) 
Selective 
(G) 
Selective  
(G; H) 
Selective  
(G; H) 
Selective  
(G; H) 
Selective 
(G) 
 
Situational Changes/ 
Mission Adjustments 
Abuse by 
AMISOM 
Piracy  
Deteriorating 
humanitarian 
situation  
Civilian 
targeting  
Al Shabaab 
Al Shabaab 
(targeting 
journalists, 
H; hostages) 
 
 
SG Recommendation Against 
POC 
mandate 
Against POC 
mandate 
Review 
AMISOM 
mandate 
Civilian 
casualties 
emphasized 
  
 
List of abbreviations:  
Foreign nationals (FN) 
Government officials (G)  
Humanitarian workers (H) 
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)  
International humanitarian law (IHL) 
International personnel (IP) 
Journalists (J) 
Women and children (WC) 
 
7KHPDQGDWHµleft very few options for protecting civilians¶107 On the ground, 
AMISOM was fighting on the TFG¶V side, which meant that POC was outside of its 
scope.108 Moreover, as UNOCI, in the course of fighting AMISOM itself was engaged in 
violence against civilians. ,WVµindiscriminate use of force«left many civilians dead or 
wounded¶109 
 Resolution 1772 (2007) reaffirmed prior UNSC resolutions on POC, women, and 
children. It stressed that protection of these groups was a responsibility of all parties in 
Somalia and called on them to ensure safety and access for AMISOM and humanitarians. 
These µdeclaratory¶ calls were made in almost all future resolutions, but µha[d] little 
HIIHFW« [V]iolence in Somalia escalated sharply¶110 
 13 
Despite the apparent need for establishment of a multinational UN peacekeeping 
force with aQµDFWLYH¶ civilian protection mandate, the SG advised against it.111 There was 
neither the political will nor the resources necessary to establish such a force. Instead, the 
Human Rights Unit of the UN Political Office for Somalia was established by Resolution 
1814 (2008) WRVWUHQJWKHQ$0,620¶VKXPDQULJKWVSURJUDPPH. 
Cycle 2: µDesignated¶ protection 
 As in Côte d¶,YRLUHspecific developments on the ground prompted the UNSC to 
further particularize the mandate. Once piracy became rampant, the UNSC requested, 
first in Resolution 1772 (2007), steps to protect merchant ships, especially those carrying 
humanitarian aid.112 This new µdesignated¶ group immediately received protection from 
interested parties, such as the European Union (EU).113 Resolution 1844 (2008) included 
obstruction of humanitarian aid among the designation criteria for targeted sanctions.  
Resolution 1863 (2009) summed up the UNSC¶V approach to Somalia. It listed the 
groups µdesignated¶ for protection to date: TFG officials involved in the negotiations, AU 
personnel, humanitarian workers, and merchant ships delivering aid. It as well advanced a 
µdeclaratory¶ call to protect Somali civilians consistent with IHL, human rights and 
refugee law.  
 Actors on the ground reflected this mandate in their µselective¶ protection efforts. 
µAMISOM troops« [were] engaged in active combat«, as their mandate require[d] 
them to protect institutions of the [TFG]¶114 The EU, among others, worked to combat 
piracy and provide humanitarian access, while the humanitarian situation deteriorated.115 
Cycle 3: From µnon-active¶ to µactive¶ and back 
2010 marked a critical change in the UNSC¶Voutlook on Somalia. As a result of 
the worsening humanitarian situation, the UNSC strengthened POC language in 
Resolution 1910 (2010). It condemned obstruction of humanitarian aid, targeting of 
journalists and humanitarians, and violations of human rights and IHL, µstress[ed]  the 
responsibility of all parties« to protect civilians, including women and children¶ and 
µcall[ed]  RQDOOSDUWLHV«WRHQVXUHWKHVDIHW\DQGVHFXULW\RIKXPDQLWDULDQSHUVRQQHO¶116 
However, these µdeclaratory¶ steps did not translate into an improved situation on 
the ground. Al Shabaab¶V increased violent opposition became a critical issue as it halted 
the operations of the World Food Programme.117 Targeted sanctions produced little result. 
Indeed, µ[n]o specific targets« were agreed until April 2010 and even then only one of 
the nine designations related to humanitarian concerns¶118 Furthermore, civilian deaths in 
fighting reached µalarming levels¶119 µ[M]any child casualties [were] caused by the 
shelling of civilian areas and indiscriminate return fire by Government and AMISOM¶120  
 In response, AMISOM mainstreamed the AU protection Guidelines and recruited 
civilian staff to update its POC strategy.121 The UNSC µ[w]elcome[d] the progress made 
by AMISOM in reducing civilian casualties¶ in Resolution 2010 (2011).122 Although the 
language was only suggestive, this was the first resolution on Somalia in the 2000s with 
an µactive¶ POC mandate, reiterated in future resolutions.123 
Apart from the progress made in reducing AMISOM-induced casualties, however, 
the situation on the ground remained unchanged. Civilian casualties continued from the 
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fighting.124 Al Shabaab maintained its activities, began targeting journalists and human 
rights defenders, among other humanitarian actors, and engaged in hostage taking.125  
The complexity and continued frustration of efforts to protect civilians prompted 
the UNSC to drop the PLVVLRQ¶V POC mandate and once again focus on the µdesignated¶ 
groups. Thus, Resolution 2073 (2012) brought the mandate full circle to focus on 
government officials involved in the peace process and AU personnel µdesignated¶ in the 
initial Resolution 1744 (2007).  
Despite the differences in the nature of the mandate and mission, the outcome, as 
in Côte G¶,YRLUHwas µpartial¶ and µselective¶ protection. AMISOM µcould not be 
expected to provide protection to the civilian population at risk while simultaneously 
engaging in ongoing offensive operations« [and] even if [it] were to be provided with a 
civilian protection mandate it would not have the necessary resources to implement such 
a mandate¶126 The cases demonstrated that µthere are clear limits to what the Council can 
do in terms of actually having an impact on the ground« [and] how easily Council focus 
FDQEHGLYHUWHG« to forget to consistently and effectively address issues of particular 
relevance to the protection of civilians agenda¶127  
Conclusion 
That the UN has institutionalized its normative obligation to protect civilians at 
risk in armed conflict is no longer a subject of debate. Instead, attention has increasingly 
focused on when and how the UN has sought to provide protection. This article advanced 
the argument that UN missions designed to address the plight of civilians largely fail to 
extend protection to other than particularized subsets of the larger civilian population.  
This result of particularized protection is brought about by the complex 
institutional dynamics involving actors producing mandates and those providing 
protection on the ground. Through their iterative relationship, with the UNSC seeking to 
manage the politics of protection, and missions struggling to cope with changing 
conditions on the ground, mandates and mission operations are adjusted over time to 
direct protection to specific subsets of civilian populations, leaving most local civilians 
with little effective protection.  
This argument has implications for both academics and practitioners. It goes 
beyond laying blame for the failures of civilian protection on the mission-capability gap 
of insufficient personnel and material resources. Instead, it focuses attention on the 
underlying institutional dynamics involved in the operation of the UNSC, which seeks to 
sustain its legitimacy in the international community by calling for protection of civilians, 
albeit often limited to declaratory statements. Operationalization of mandates inevitably 
introduces hard realities, namely that an overarching goal of peace operations is to end 
conflict, thus prioritizing protection of UN mission personnel and relevant officials. 
Humanitarians, journalists, and medical personnel, in essence, groups from and of interest 
to external actors also receive attention. Further study of the operational logic of the 
UNSC, beyond narratives of individual missions, and of the direction and influence of SG 
is called for.128 For instance, such investigations would extend the scope of recent work 
by Barnett and Finnemore on UNHCR to focus on the UNSC.   
By focusing attention on the institutional complexities of civilian protection, this 
article adds an important nuance to the ongoing studies of UN peacekeeping reform. As 
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the latest High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations suggests, µ813HDFH
Operations are more complex and robust than ever with mandates ranging from 
protecting civilian populations and preventing ethnic conflict to stabilization operations 
and facing down anti-government and extremist groups¶.129 This article acknowledges 
this challenging peacekeeping environment, where peacekeepers are expected to carry out 
multi-dimensional tasks, and daunting civilian protection efforts. It points to the necessity 
of considering the differing incentives and constraints involved across the range of 
relevant actors²the UNSC, the Secretariat, the SG, UN personnel, mission commanders, 
external actors (e.g. humanitarians and journalists), local officials, and civilian 
populations²and across the difficult, changing conditions of a mission. The 
establishment of an initial mandate is only the first step in a process of refinement and 
reorientation that results in the particularized protection of only a small fraction of the 
civilians at risk.  
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